Russia Could Invade Moldova in Days If Ukraine Weakens – Ex-Moldovan Spy Chief (2025)

In the Kyiv Post newsroom, Iurii Briceag – a soldier, intelligence officer and politician – calmly opens up a map to demonstrate his concerns.

“If Ukraine weakens,” he says, “Russian troops from Transnistria could reach Chișinău in a matter of days.”

There is no panic in his voice – only experience, facts, and a deep understanding of hybrid warfare, which Moldova has endured for decades.

This isn’t speculation – it’s the conclusion of someone who led Moldova’s military intelligence from 2020 to 2022, during a period marked by Russian-backed hybrid attacks, political sabotage, and disinformation campaigns that shook the region’s stability.

“I don’t believe Ukraine can lose,” Briceag says. “But if the Russians manage to break through and bypass Odesa, they could move into Transnistria. They already have the equipment and manpower there. In just a few days, they could reach Chișinău. These are very real threats, and we must look at them soberly.”

Briceag serves as vice president of the Coalition for Unity and Welfare (CUB) – a center-right political party rooted in social liberalism. CUB advocates for Moldova’s full integration into the EU, defends democracy and the rule of law, and actively resists any return to Kremlin influence.

Briceag now regularly travels to Ukraine, visiting wounded soldiers and meeting with lawmakers. His message is clear: “Russia’s war is not just about Ukraine. It’s about us, too.”

Transnistria: A frozen front that could ignite

The conversation quickly shifts to the key concern – Transnistria’s role in Russia’s strategy.

“[Russia’s] military presence in Transnistria is like a thorn in Ukraine’s side,” Briceag Brichag explains.

“President [Volodymyr] Zelensky and other military leaders have repeatedly stated that if Moldova requests help, Ukraine could provide it. But without an official request, no one will cross that line. No one will violate international law.”

Because of the threat of an attack from the rear, Ukrainian forces are forced to keep some units stationed along the border with the unrecognized republic of Transnistria.

Still, Briceag firmly opposes any military solution: “Eighty percent of that contingent consists of Moldovan citizens with Transnistrian residence and Moldovan documents. We need to restore constitutional order – not shoot our own people. There are other methods – economic, financial, legal.”

Russian influence and “hybrid warfare” in the region

Briceag doesn’t hide his impressions after traveling through the territory of the so-called Transnistrian Moldovan Republic (PMR):

“I had the chance to walk the streets, talk to people, see what’s on store shelves. If we had a time machine, it would take us straight back to the Soviet Union. It’s tidy and clean, but everything is poor. And on TV, they still broadcast slogans and scare stories – about how the Romanians will come and oppress them. It’s a branch of North Korea.”

“The Russian Federation decided to change the government in Moldova without any military action – by injecting financial flows into the economy, media, and political parties, and by buying votes. This is hybrid warfare of a new kind.”

He says Russian influence has spread through cultural centers, business networks, civil society groups, and political campaigns. Even the church, subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchate, has tens of thousands of followers and, according to the former intelligence chief, serves as a religious echo chamber for Kremlin propaganda.

Briceag cites the case of lawmaker Ilan Shor, who – after being sentenced – got into a Russian embassy car and fled to Transnistria. In 2017, Shor was sentenced to seven and a half years for his role in the infamous “billion-dollar theft” from Moldovan banks. But after appealing the verdict and the change in government in 2019, he was able to flee the country.

“And this is our problem, because there are no professionals dealing with these threats at the level required,” he laments.

Despite President Maia Sandu’s pro-European rhetoric, pro-Russian forces have not disappeared from Moldova. On the contrary, Briceag says, they are now rebranding themselves as “pro-European” to deceive voters.

“Just look at Chișinău Mayor Ion Ceban,” he adds. “He started with the Communists, then joined the Socialists, and now has created his own party that claims to support the EU.”

Ceban, currently the head of the National Alternative Movement (MAN), won the mayoral election in Chișinău in 2019 with the backing of the pro-Russian Socialist Party. He later distanced himself from the party and founded his own political force in 2021.

The country’s next parliamentary elections are due to be held on Sept. 28, 2025. According to Briceag, the current Moldovan government has lost public trust: “People really wanted change. But those who came to power were often inexperienced, never held public office, and so we got mistakes, problems, disappointment. Judicial reform hasn’t succeeded. Corruption is still alive and well.”

According to Briceag, around 3,000 Russian troops are stationed in the region: “There are peacekeepers and a Russian task force guarding the arms depot in Cobasna – one of the largest in Europe since World War II.”

“If, God forbid, the Russians succeed in breaking through and bypassing Odesa, they could enter Transnistria – and from there, they could reach Chișinău in days,” he warns again.

Ineffective leadership

What angers Briceag most is the inaction toward the leadership of the self-proclaimed Transnistrian Moldovan Republic (PMR): “Last year, our parliament passed amendments to the Criminal Code regarding separatism. And guess what? Not a single person has been prosecuted, even though the entire PMR leadership could be jailed under that article alone.”

Briceag criticizes the current Moldovan government’s lack of qualified leadership: “The minister of infrastructure is a historian by education. The minister of internal affairs has a medical background. They don’t understand how the system works. And that creates total collapse in key areas.”

Reflecting on regional patterns, Briceag recalls how figures from Transnistria exported their know-how after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in Donbas: “We had a guy – Antyufeyev. He was ‘Minister of State Security’ in Transnistria and later took the same role in Donbas. His wife is still a member of Transnistria’s so-called parliament.”

“They came and started showing how to transfer money from the Russian Federation, how the economy can function under occupation. You’re right to say: these are similar situations – South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Donbas, Crimea, Transnistria.”

Ukraine – more than just a neighbor to Moldova

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moldova has become acutely aware of how vital Ukraine is to its own security.

“Thankfully, we don’t share a border with Russia, and that saves us. But we do have Russian troops on our territory, in Transnistria.”

Briceag recalls his own time in intelligence: “During my service, we had excellent cooperation with Ukraine’s security services. We shared information, signed joint agreements... I truly hope that’s still the case – that our agencies are working together against our common enemy: the Russian Federation.”

He also remembers Moldova’s response to the refugee crisis in early 2022: “I remember how my children volunteered – welcoming Ukrainian children, offering food, helping out. It was shocking. A moment when part of Moldova saw Ukraine not just as a neighboring country, but as a shield.”

Today, more 80,000 Ukrainian refugees remain in Moldova.

“They’ve integrated well – many have jobs, some even bought homes. But all of them are waiting for one thing: the chance to go home.”

Despite skepticism from some of his fellow citizens, Briceag continues to speak out about Russia’s war. He visits Ukraine regularly, meets with people, and brings their stories back to Moldova.

“I travel there often. And then I tell people what’s really happening in Ukraine – what a war with Russia actually looks like. But many don’t believe it. They’re skeptical. Because they’ve never seen it up close.”

He doesn’t speak in slogans. He speaks in hard facts – about the weapons depot in Cobasna, the Kremlin-backed agents, the churches spreading Moscow’s messages. But ultimately, he speaks about choice – a painful, human, and strategic one.

“I’ll tell you this: eighty percent of people in Transnistria know their future lies with the Republic of Moldova. We have to give them a reason to believe in it. We have to offer them an alternative. Because if we don’t – Russia will.”